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Abstract
This article highlights the dominant aims of the current BJP gov-
ernment concerning India’s foreign policy. Using a constructiv-
ist-centered and discourse-orientated approach, it distils the three 
prevailing strategic goals integral to the Narendra Modi-led re-
gime, namely gaining great power recognition; realizing a multi-
polar world order; and enacting the “Act East” policy. The study 
finds that, although proof of a prevailing “Modi Doctrine” is scarce, 
the presence of these three aims is notably consistent and prevalent 
within official discourses and scholarly accounts of the foreign pol-
icy preferences of the second NDA. Their repetition and reiteration 
constitutes evidence of both a significant acceleration and a note-
worthy tone shift concerning how Indian foreign policy has been 
conceptualized and conducted since 2014.
Keywords: Modi, great power, multipolarity, Act East, constructiv-
ism, discourse
  
Resumen
Este artículo resalta los objetivos principales del gobierno actual 
de BJP en relación con la política exterior de India. Utilizando un 
acercamiento centrado en el constructivismo y orientado hacia el 
discurso, formula los tres objetivos estratégicos principales que 
son vitales para el régimen de Narendra Modi, es decir; obtener un 
gran reconocimiento del poder; crear un orden mundial multipo-
lar; y el promulgar la política “Act East.” El estudio encuentra que, 
a pesar de que haya pocas pruebas de que la “Doctrina Modi” esté 
prevaleciendo, la presencia de estos tres objetivos es notablemente 
consistente y prevalente dentro de los discursos oficiales y narrati-
vas académicas de las preferencias de política exterior y la segunda 
National Democratic Alliance. La repetición y reiteración consti-
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The overwhelming general elec-tion triumph of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in May 2014 
heralded a remarkable and seismic 
event in India’s electoral history. The 
party’s ascent to power was the first 
outright majority victory since that of 
Rajiv Gandhi in 1984 in the aftermath 
of his mother’s assassination, as the BJP 
won 282 seats and their wider National 
Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition 
secured 336 of the 543 Lok Sabha seats. 
The BJP were back in power again af-
ter the 1998–2004 NDA under Atal Bi-
hari Vajpayee, which had then been the 
ﬁrst full-term government not led by 
a prime minister from the Indian Na-
tional Congress (INC). The result con-
firmed the maturation of the country’s 
political system as having two viable, 
experienced and competitive parties, a 
trend that had begun in the 1990s. With 
the BJP now being led by the assertive 
and self-confident Narendra Modi, 
there was accompanying speculation 
of imminent shifts and changes in the 
way that both domestic and interna-
tional politics would be conducted in 
tuye evidencia tanto de una aceleración significativa, como de un 
cambio de tono en relación con el concepto de la política exterior 
india y su gestión desde 2014.
Palabras Clave: Modi, gran poder, multipolaridad, Act East, cons-
tructivismo, discurso
摘要
本文强调了印度人民党政府在印度外交政策方面的主要目
标。通过应用以建构主义为中心、话语为导向的方法，本文
从纳伦德拉·莫迪领导的政权中提炼了三大战略目标，即获
得大国认可；实现多极化世界秩序；和制定“东向行动”
（Act East）政策。文章发现，尽管“莫迪式教条”（Modi 
Doctrine）成为普遍概念的迹象还很稀少，但这三大目标是
极其一致的，且常见于官方话语、和有关印度国家民主联盟
外交政策偏好的学术记录。这三大目标的不断重复证明了印
度外交政策自2014年以来在如何被概念化和实施一事上出现
了显著的“加速”和值得注意的“语调转变”。
关键词：莫迪，大国，多极化，东向（行动），结构主义，
话语
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India. Swift claims of a “Modi Doc-
trine” abounded,1 as did assertions by 
leading scholars of a very clear change 
in India’s foreign policy inclinations.2 
At the very least, observers noted that 
“the difference between Modi and his 
predecessors is a matter of energy and 
style,”3 which would produce clear 
changes concerning how India’s ruling 
party would approach, perform, and 
delineate its governance. 
The 1998–2004 BJP-led NDA 
had inculcated significant develop-
ments in the conduct of Indian foreign 
policy, most conspicuously the substan-
tial deepening of India’s relations with 
the United States, as well as with Chi-
na, primarily through the 1998 nucle-
ar tests that propelled India back into 
the international mainstream.4 Then 
Prime Minister Vajpayee also embold-
ened India’s gradual embrace of liber-
al economics and an appreciation of 
some of the virtues of globalization,5 
particularly as the means by which to 
strengthen and legitimize India’s status 
within the international system. More 
than anything else, it was greater prag-
matism, self-confidence, and assertive-
ness, and an acceptance of the efficacy 
of pre-emptive engagement, that fun-
damentally characterized the BJP’s im-
plementation of policy during the first 
NDA, as did frequently stressing India’s 
aspirations to be a great power.6 
Concerning foreign affairs, the 
BJP’s 2014 election manifesto stated 
“the vision is to fundamentally reboot 
and reorient the foreign policy goals, 
content and process, in a manner that 
locates India’s global strategic engage-
ment in a new paradigm.”7 This arti-
cle seeks to interrogate whether or not 
such a profound shift is currently tak-
ing place, by identifying and analyzing 
the key aims orienting Indian foreign 
policy under Modi. Realizing this goal 
is achieved through the application 
of a constructivist-centered and dis-
course-oriented approach in order to 
evidence the preponderance of these 
key aims in both official documents 
and existing scholarly perspectives, and 
hence their established normative pres-
ence within the policy proclivities of 
the present NDA government. Such an 
analysis is developed through four main 
sections. The first section introduces 
the article’s theoretical foundations, pri-
marily the efficacy of the constructivist 
approach which is able to provide a fo-
cused means of analysis that highlights 
policy preferences specific to the Indian 
context. This approach is coupled with 
an emphasis on discourse as the vehicle 
with which to identify these dominant 
aims. The subsequent sections then uti-
lize this largely norms-based approach 
to examine the three key aims of Indian 
foreign policy under Modi, which are 
specifically; gaining great power recog-
nition; realizing a multipolar world or-
der; and enacting the “Act East” policy.
Theoretical Lens and 
the Use of Discourse
Mainstream International Re-
lations (IR) theory offers several ap-
proaches with which to analyze the for-
eign policy of states. Of these, realism 
stands out at the most pervasive meth-
od through its emphasis upon how 
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states project power via the accumula-
tion of material power. For structural 
or neo-realists, anarchy is the prevailing 
condition in the international system, 
whereby having a balance of power and 
gaining some form of hegemony are the 
only guarantees of stability. Objective in 
their stance, such realists view states as 
“undifferentiated and unitary actors,”8 
and disregard any consideration of state 
identities and their construction. Be-
cause structural realists “ignore human 
nature,”9 they assume a blanket defini-
tion of identity that makes it irrelevant 
to inter-state relations. Hence, realists 
claim that—due to the structural pres-
sures placed upon them by the inter-
national system—states should act in 
the same manner in order to survive 
and thrive. The interests of states thus 
appear as exogenous to state practice, 
which emanate from the system to the 
state, while “culture and identity are, 
at best, derivative of the distribution of 
capabilities and have no independent 
explanatory power.”10 Such an intellec-
tual basis gives scant recognition to the 
potential role played by different types 
of government, varying internal deci-
sion-making processes or indeed the 
beliefs of a particular state’s political 
parties or leaders. This typically cul-
ture-neutral structural realist account 
downplays the impact of these factors 
because of its assertion that the inter-
national structure dominates how states 
conceptualize their foreign policies.
Other strands of realism provide 
some more useful openings concerning 
how to analyze the particular foreign 
policy aims of states, or specific parties/
individuals within them. Importantly in 
this regard, classical realist approaches 
acknowledge how “identities and values 
(a)re more important determinants of 
policy than the constraints and oppor-
tunities of the external environment.”11 
Building upon these ideas, neo-classi-
cal realism refines structural realism 
by being more attentive to domestic 
variables,12 and rests upon seeking to 
understand how “systemic forces can 
only influence foreign policy through 
the medium of leader’s perceptions and 
calculations of relative power and pres-
tige.”13 These elements are then seen 
as intervening variables between the 
external pressures of the international 
system and the foreign policy behavior 
of different states. Within this milieu, 
“‘ideas and material capabilities are al-
ways bound together, mutually rein-
forcing one another, and not reducible 
one to the other’,”14 highlighting how 
aims and aspirations (and their identi-
fication) have an important role to play 
within how different states conceive of 
their particular foreign policies.
While neo-classical realism ap-
pears somewhat applicable to our study, 
other IR theories provide more focused 
means of analysis. Most notably, and 
in contrast to most realist theory, con-
structivism is explicitly concerned with 
ideational factors (such as identities and 
norms) rather than with more objective 
or material conditions. As such, it cen-
ters upon “a cognitive, intersubjective 
conception of process in which identi-
ties and interests are endogenous to in-
teraction.”15 In turn, constructivists de-
clare that states are social constructions 
whereby, “we make the world what it is 
... by doing what we do with each oth-
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er and saying what we say to each oth-
er.”16 In order to trace and structure its 
ideational account of international re-
lations, constructivism largely focuses 
upon norms—“a particular set of inter-
ests and preferences”17—that are social-
ly constructed and constantly contested 
through elite narratives. Such a basis 
is especially useful for explaining how 
foreign policy evolves across different 
political parties and leaders, which is 
our analytical goal concerning wheth-
er the Modi regime has impacted—or 
not—upon India’s core foreign policy 
aims. As our study largely relates to ide-
ational aspirations, rather than material 
measures, it is therefore a suitable ana-
lytical vehicle.
In order to show “how discourse 
... (provides) empirical evidence for the 
operation of norms,”18 the analysis of 
various speeches, policy documents, 
and scholarly works acts as a core ex-
amination tool for constructivists. 
From their theoretical standpoint, lan-
guage creates and describes reality, as 
“social facts depend, by way of collec-
tive understanding and discourse, on 
the attachment of collective knowledge 
to physical reality.”19 It is from this ba-
sis that the reason “language is so im-
portant to constructivist analysis is that 
speech binds together is and ought,”20 
which is especially important concern-
ing the unveiling the aims of Modi’s 
foreign policy. As such, it is how often 
certain ideas and phrases occur and 
re-occur in the discourse surrounding 
a particular issue that determines the 
dominant narratives pertinent to that 
issue, whereby “political rhetoric—or 
persuasive discourse—is a mechanism 
for generating collective understand-
ings”21 concerning what is said, report-
ed on, written about, and analyzed. 
Processes of repetition, frequency, and 
reiteration all serve to operationalize 
and unveil these dominant discursive 
and language practices, which for this 
study will result in deriving the prevail-
ing aims (here also described as norms 
and preferences) underpinning India’s 
foreign policy under the current NDA.
Using a constructivist-oriented 
approach and an emphasis on discourse 
will identify the major narratives con-
structing, underpinning, and delineat-
ing the dominant aims of the Modi-led 
NDA concerning Indian foreign policy. 
The value of this approach and empha-
sis is apparent concerning the three 
targeted key aspects of India’s foreign 
policy behaviour under Modi—great 
power recognition, a multipolar world 
order, and the Act East policy—all of 
which are innately ideational in that 
they concern particular visions of how 
India ought to be perceived and ought to 
behave within the international sphere. 
Reviewing the discourses present in 
the literature evaluating—and primary 
documents depicting—the Modi-led 
BJP, it is this triumvirate that has been 
the most frequent and evident so far. It 
is also for this reason that our analysis 
is inherently focused away from analyz-
ing New Delhi’s South Asian relations 
(especially with Pakistan), myriad link-
ages with West Asia, or India’s connec-
tivity initiatives in Africa. An emphasis 
away from these areas is because none 
of them directly fall within the three 
key aims of the Modi regime regard-
ing India’s global position (to be a great 
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power) or the nature of the internation-
al system (to be multipolar), and are 
further geographically estranged from 
the Act East policy’s core focus upon 
the wider Indo-Pacific.
Identifying Modi’s Core 
Strategic Aims
With the BJP’s ascendancy to office, India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) 
proclaimed a “renewed energy, vigor, 
and planning in India’s engagement 
with the rest of the world,”22 as the tone 
of their annual reports became con-
sistently more self-assured, visionary, 
and global in scope. Resolutely reflect-
ing the pro-activeness associated with 
BJP diplomacy, India was presented 
as “a confident, articulate, (and) rising 
power ... no longer content to merely 
react to international developments.”23 
Officials similarly noted how “an India 
that aspires to a greater global role must 
necessarily have a larger diplomat-
ic footprint,”24 a proclamation backed 
up by the significant upswing in dip-
lomatic missions, visits, and summits 
under Modi that has exceeded those 
of Manmohan Singh during the previ-
ous UPA. This use of personal diplo-
macy led scholars to declare that the 
new NDA was “a much more decisive 
and conﬁdent government, which has 
injected a new sense of dynamism in 
Indian foreign policy.”25 The NDA was 
also less ambivalent in promoting In-
dia internationally, and more explicit 
in achieving greater status, recognition, 
and power on the global stage. Central 
to these arguments was an upswing of 
the BJP’s characteristic pragmatism,26 
whereby hard-nosed and nationalist di-
plomacy meant that “pragmatism, not 
principle, and delivery, not doctrine ... 
(are) the marks of Modi’s approach.”27 
The discourse of Indian foreign pol-
icy has become permeated by such a 
style/approach under Modi. Strong 
personal drive and focus underpins 
such an style, whereby—in Modi’s own 
words—“‘whichever assignment is giv-
en to me ... I am totally involved in it. 
I never think about my past, I never 
think about my future’.”28
Gaining Great Power Recognition
Positioning India within the upper most 
tiers of the global hierarchy as one of a 
handful of the world’s great powers has 
been the first major strategic aim of the 
new NDA. Continuing the approach of 
his predecessors, Modi is “unabashed 
about India’s great power aspiration”29 
in his speeches and exchanges. As he 
declared to his supporters in 2014—“‘I 
assure you that this country [India] has 
a destiny’,”30 which would play a signif-
icant role in international politics. Na-
tionalist sentiments have underpinned 
such assertions, in combination with a 
“self-perception of national and cultural 
greatness,”31 which has become increas-
ingly prevalent across most major polit-
ical groupings in India. Further encap-
sulating these narratives, upon gaining 
ofﬁce Modi furthermore decried that 
the twenty-ﬁrst century was to be “‘In-
dia’s century’”32 during which the state’s 
status ambitions would be fulfilled.
Central to being a great power 
has been the Indian elites’ augmentation 
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of the state’s self-sufficiency in interna-
tional affairs. Within this thinking, the 
concept of India’s “strategic autonomy” 
has gained greater prominence in offi-
cial discourses whereby it “undergird(s) 
its quest for security and status.”33 Real-
izing such autonomy rests upon accu-
mulating sufficient amounts of power 
for India “to articulate its own interests 
in foreign policy and in the shaping of 
the world order,”34 which marks conti-
nuity from a long-held preference for 
self-reliance. Underpinning these glob-
al ambitions is a sense that India is a 
state that “cannot be ignored  ... (and) 
one whose relative weight and influence 
in material terms have been increasing 
over the past decade.”35 Predominant 
to such narratives is increasing India’s 
position as a large developing econo-
my that can be of potential benefit to 
the current global economic order, and 
strengthening “Brand India” as a means 
to enhance her domestic moderniza-
tion programme. Integral to such link-
ages, and in conjunction with ensuring 
energy and trade security, is cultivating 
defense and multilateral capabilities 
that embolden the self-realization of its 
strategic autonomy. An ever-greater ap-
preciation of India as a “swing state” of 
value to a host of major states—such as 
the United States and Japan—has also 
helped to boost this tactical aim.
Harking back to the clear 
pro-capitalist tendencies typifying the 
BJP’s economic approach, “Modi’s gov-
ernment has adopted a more pro-busi-
ness stance than its predecessor.”36 Re-
flecting how many voters’ concerns in 
the 2014 election related to the econo-
my, India’s modernizing, globalizing, 
and media-dominated middle class re-
mains a core constituency for the BJP. 
Modi has henceforth “repeatedly em-
phasized the goal of promoting growth 
and employment generation as the fun-
damental criterion for a successful for-
eign policy.”37 This focus has led to a slew 
of innovations such as “Make in India,” 
“Skill India,” “Digital India,” and “Start 
Up India,” all of which are intended to 
boost foreign direct investment, cre-
ate jobs, enhance workforce skills, and 
increase production standards. Broad-
ening the bandwidth of India’s interna-
tional diplomacy, via an ever-widening 
multi-directional diplomatic strategy, 
illustrates this aim as New Delhi seeks 
new trade and energy partners across 
Asia, Africa, and South America. These 
ties have included enhanced Saudi Ara-
bia relations, as well as major invest-
ment pledges worth $35 billion and $22 
billion from Japan and China, respec-
tively.38 Modi’s creation of “a web of al-
lies to mutually further our [India’s] in-
terests”39 has galvanized these interests, 
and has further entrenched the norm of 
gaining great power recognition.
Apart from displaying clear—
and accelerating—continuities from 
the first NDA and the 2004–14 UPA 
regimes concerning enhancing India’s 
great power status through expanding 
self-sufficiency and greater economic 
capabilities, NDA II has maintained, 
reinvigorated, and deepened relations 
with the United States. As an estab-
lished great power, Washington cru-
cially acts as a gatekeeper, sponsor, and 
endorser of emergent great powers,40 
and is thus central to the attainment of 
India’s status aspirations in the current 
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global system. In line with the new dy-
namism noted by observers concerning 
the general tenor of Indian diplomacy, 
“the Modi government has been able 
to pursue a new and decisive course, ... 
allow(ing) bilateral relations to achieve 
positive momentum compared to the 
drift observed in the final years of the 
second UPA administration.”41 As per 
the first NDA, the BJP has furthermore 
sought an unequivocal and un-am-
bivalent embrace of the United States, 
which displays none of the ideological 
baggage or hang-ups associated with 
previous INC leaders. In these ways, 
“Modi has tossed away not only the 
hesitations but also the hypocrisies of 
history”42 by shifting the tone under-
pinning India-US relations, which un-
derpins how his particular leadership 
values/style (as central to constructivist 
accounts) have influenced the nature of 
these diplomatic ties.
Underscoring these sentiments, 
when Narendra Modi and President 
Obama met in 2014, they issued a state-
ment proclaiming that “we will have a 
transformative relationship as trusted 
partners in the 21st century, ... our part-
nership will be a model for the rest of 
the world.”43 Since then, relations have 
centered upon deepening coopera-
tion in the fields of defence, trade, civil 
nuclear affairs, and Asian security. In 
2015, Obama also became the first US 
President to be the chief guest at India’s 
Republic Day parade. During that vis-
it, the “US-India Joint Strategic Vision 
for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean 
Region” was signed outlining a shared 
understanding to promote “peace, 
prosperity, stability and security, ... and 
not(ed) that India’s ‘Act East Policy’ and 
the United States’ rebalance to Asia pro-
vide (mutual) opportunities.”44 In June 
2015, the “New Framework for Defence 
Cooperation” was formally renewed for 
10 years during the visit of US Secretary 
of Defense Ashton Carter. This agree-
ment then led to the signing of a “Mas-
ter Information Exchange Agreement” 
between the Pentagon and India’s Min-
istry of Defense to share aircraft-carrier 
technology heavily desired by New Del-
hi. The frequency of these diplomatic 
agreements and their accompanying 
scholarly analysis reiterated the impor-
tance of India-US relations within the 
wider foreign policy aim of great power 
recognition, and confirmed its norma-
tive presence under the Modi govern-
ment. 
Modi further extolled these vir-
tues when addressing the US Congress 
in June 2016, asserting that “there is a 
new symphony in play”45 as Indian of-
ficials further emboldened relations by 
noting mutual ties “rooted in shared 
values of freedom, democracy, univer-
sal human rights, tolerance and plural-
ism, equal opportunities for all citizens, 
and rule of law”46—elements that fur-
ther celebrated and reiterated the politi-
cal commonalities between them. Later 
in that year, India and the United States 
also signed a long-awaited defense 
agreement—the “Logistics Exchange 
Memorandum of Agreement,” which 
had been negotiated since 2004. Over-
coming the deep-seated hesitations 
of previous Indian governments, who 
were wary of entering into such a close 
defense partnership with the United 
States, the Agreement allowed “both 
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sides to access supplies, spare parts and 
services from land facilities, air bases 
and ports.”47 Pragmatism underpinned 
this deal, with New Delhi critically di-
versifying its defense supplies away 
from Russia.48 With the new Trump ad-
ministration, and in a 2017 visit to the 
United States, the two sides declared 
themselves “democratic stalwarts in 
the Indo-Pacific region ... resolved to 
increase cooperation, enhance diplo-
matic consultations, and increase tangi-
ble collaboration.”49 In unison with the 
drive toward strategic autonomy, and 
continued economic growth, heighten-
ing United States ties served to encap-
sulate India’s sought-after status aims in 
the new NDA.
Realizing a Multipolar World Order 
At the core of the BJP’s wider vision of 
global politics in the twenty-first centu-
ry is the concept of multipolarity. This 
understanding pronounces that there 
are multiple powers (or poles) compet-
ing for influence in the international 
system rather than it being dominat-
ed by a single unipolar power through 
hegemony. Within this worldview, the 
multiple poles are argued—in addi-
tion to the United States—to be China 
and Russia, and potentially the EU, as 
well as India once the country has fully 
reached great power status. It is under-
pinned by collective cooperation con-
cerning mutual development, equality, 
and non-intervention—all of which 
are core, longstanding principles with-
in Indian foreign policy, and which are 
highly evident in relations with China 
and Russia but currently less so with the 
United States. Cooperation in multilat-
eral regimes bolsters these interactions, 
whereby “an important trajectory ... has 
been (the) simultaneous deepening of 
India’s ties with all the major powers of 
the world by focusing on ... mutual syn-
ergies and gains.”50 The greater frequen-
cy and bandwidth with which these 
relations have been pursued has been 
central to Indian foreign policy under 
Modi, as reflected by their preponder-
ance in official and analytical discours-
es. In 2014, when the BJP came to pow-
er, leading members further argued 
that India was a vishwaguru (“world 
guru”); “a ‘leading power’ ... equipped 
with a clear vision of how international 
affairs ought to be organized, not mere-
ly a power that accepts the system as it 
is”51—a sentiment that underscores the 
presence of this foreign policy aim to 
re-craft the international order.
With this proactive image in 
mind—both of the world and India’s 
status in it—Modi’s diplomacy has en-
compassed “a strategy of building social 
capital for upward mobility by network-
ing bilaterally and multilaterally to gain 
prominent standing for India.”52 Ob-
servers have noted that this approach 
rejects long-standing norms relating to 
non-alignment,53 which has been met 
with “deafening silence,”54 and has in-
stead been substantiated by “multi-align-
ment”—an approach characterized 
by “engagement in regional multilat-
eral institutions, the use of strategic 
partnerships, and ... ‘normative hedg-
ing’.”55 The desired preference for multi- 
polarity, in conjunction with multi- 
alignment, represents “an ability to 
adopt a paradigm of confident engage-
ment with the simultaneous pursuit of 
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different interests with various partners 
while maintaining a cohesive unity in 
our [India’s] overall strategic vision.”56 
As part of this process, in 2015 for in-
stance, India entered into new strategic 
partnerships with Canada, Mongolia, 
Oman, Seychelles, the United Arab 
Emirates, and the United Kingdom. Re-
alizing “an economically stronger India 
... (whose) voice is heard in internation-
al fora”57 heightens these abilities, as 
will be discussed later on in this section. 
Furthermore, and again sustaining the 
state’s continued quest for great power 
status, “as a government committed to 
economic growth ... this is translating 
into a growing ability (by the Modi re-
gime) to take on a more constructive 
role in global governance”;58 an ability 
that is commensurate with, and em-
blematic of, fulfilling the aim of being 
one of the international system’s major 
poles.
The first prong of the multipo-
lar approach has been to ensure better 
ties with the other great powers. The 
most longstanding of these are with 
Russia, which has been a steadfast stra-
tegic partner of India since 1947, pro-
viding it with economic, military, and 
political support.59 Under Modi, and 
bolstered by his frequent diplomatic 
missions to Moscow in 2015 and 2017, 
and a visit by President Putin to New 
Delhi in 2016, the relationship remains 
“rooted in longstanding mutual trust, 
characterized by unmatched recipro-
cal support to each other’s core inter-
ests.”60 In 2015, the two sides carried 
out joint Russian-Indian naval exercises 
in the Bay of Bengal, as well as the IN-
DRA-2015 joint exercises conducted in 
Rajasthan involving their ground forc-
es. In turn, their ties have been progres-
sively reiterated and upgraded whereby 
“the Indian-Russian special and privi-
leged strategic partnership is a unique 
relationship of mutual trust between 
two great powers.”61 Importantly, both 
sides subscribe to a similar vision for 
the world order that seeks “a multi-po-
lar international system based on the 
central role of the United Nations and 
international law, common interests, 
equality, mutual respect and non-inter-
ference in the internal affairs of coun-
tries.”62 The commonality of this shared 
normative aim thus furthermore inter-
twines and characterizes their relations 
together.
While Indo-Russia ties have 
continued to be strengthened under 
Modi, elsewhere the BJP’s diplomatic 
approach centered upon assertive prag-
matism has been highly visible toward 
China. At the core of the NDA’s atti-
tude to Beijing is the conviction that 
“the two sides believe that the 21st cen-
tury should be marked by peace, secu-
rity, development and cooperation.”63 
The two states also share an affinity in 
terms of their vision of the global or-
der, and their status/roles within it. As 
such, during Modi’s 2015 visit to China, 
both sides agreed to “step up their con-
sultations on developments affecting 
international peace, security and devel-
opment,  ... (and) coordinate their po-
sitions and work together to shape the 
regional and global agenda,”64 which 
included cooperation in a variety of 
multilateral settings. Furthermore, both 
sides have publicly stated that their “si-
multaneous re-emergence ... as two ma-
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jor powers in the region and the world, 
offers a momentous opportunity for 
(the) realisation of the Asian Century.”65 
These common aims have thus further 
enhanced the normative presence and 
importance of the strategic preference 
for a multipolar world order.
Although this rhetoric in many 
ways mimics that of previous UPA 
governments, at the core of Modi’s ap-
proach is the new belief that positive 
gains can only be achieved through a 
“dogged and open style of assertive di-
plomacy.”66 Thus, while major trade and 
investment gains were realized during 
the visit of Xi Jinping to India in 2014, 
Prime Minister Modi emphasized that 
“‘there should be peace in our relations 
and in the borders. If this happens, we 
can realise (the) true potential of our 
relations’.”67 As such, the new NDA has 
been more forceful in its use of India’s 
military capabilities, especially along 
the Himalayan border68 and also enact-
ing stronger responses concerning any 
incursions by Chinese troops (which 
have occurred on several occasions). In-
dian officials have also publically vowed 
that Arunachal Pradesh (which the two 
sides dispute) is an inalienable part of 
India, and to which the Indian Home 
Minister openly visited in 2015. As part 
of this strategy, and as already evidenced 
above concerning Indo-US ties, “to an 
unprecedented degree, India is openly 
embarking on coalition-building ... as 
a way of strengthening its bargaining 
position”69 versus Beijing, and which 
has so far involved Vietnam, Japan, and 
Australia. In turn, New Delhi refused to 
be part of China “One Belt, One Road” 
initiative, arguing that it had not been 
sufficiently consulted but also because 
the Chinese-Pakistan Economic Corri-
dor (CPEC) runs through the disputed 
Kashmir region. Collectively, these de-
velopments represent “a qualitative shift 
in relations with the PRC,”70 and show 
a marked change from the previous 10 
years of India-China interactions under 
the UPA whereby the tone of Indian di-
plomacy has now changed.
The final strand of the strategy 
to achieve multipolarity is institutional, 
whereby India “has discovered ‘exclu-
sive multilateralism’”71 as a fruitful dip-
lomatic endeavor. So enhanced are New 
Delhi’s efforts in this domain that schol-
ars have argued that “Modi’s leadership 
may be just as important in enhancing 
India’s willingness to take on the role 
of an international leader as it seems 
to be in improving India’s ability to do 
so”72—again underlining the veracity of 
the BJP’s assertive and pragmatic pub-
lic diplomacy, and the evidence of their 
specific political values and identity (as 
per constructivism) influencing the 
conduct of Indian foreign policy. India’s 
involvement in helping set up the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank in Oc-
tober 2014, as well as the New Develop-
ment Bank in July 2014, points to this 
new-found self-confidence. Overarch-
ing these efforts, in 2017 India became a 
full member of the Shanghai Coopera-
tion Organisation, which Modi deemed 
to be “a logical extension India’s age 
old ties with the region; ... India’s en-
gagement ... will help us build a region 
which is an engine of economic growth 
for the world; (and) is more stable.”73 
These efforts point to an international 
system that is in flux and how India is 
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“exploring the scope for building coali-
tions focused on global order in what is 
conceivably becoming a post-unipolar 
world,”74 and which simultaneously en-
hances New Delhi’s aim/preference for 
evoking a multipolar world order.
Enacting the “Act East” Policy
Bolstering both strategic aims of be-
coming a great power and visualizing 
a multipolar world order, ordaining 
the “Act East” policy has been the third 
aim of the Modi government. This pol-
icy is an extension of the “Look East” 
policy first introduced under P.V. Nara-
simha Rao to create deeper common 
military, economic, and diplomatic 
ties with South East Asia. It also builds 
upon the NDA I’s assertion of India’s 
“extended strategic neighbourhood,” 
which sought to stretch India’s per-
ceived influence beyond South Asia to 
find new international trade, commod-
ity, and energy markets to enhance In-
dia’s economic growth and great power 
ambitions. Injecting a proactive vein to 
these existing policies, Act East seeks to 
realize the core assumption of the twen-
ty-first century being the Asian Centu-
ry, as well as inter-connecting India to 
the Asia-Pacific region via a recently 
coined self-conception centered upon 
the “nationalist-pragmatist hybrid for-
mulation of the Indo-Pacific.”75 From 
this basis, New Delhi has “put the whole 
Indo-Pacific region at the very top of its 
diplomatic priorities ... (whereby) In-
dia step(ped) up its effort to contribute 
to regional peace and stability.”76 Via 
this strategy, NDA II not only desires 
“to promote Indo-Pacific regionalism 
to decisively boost the Indian econo-
my”77 but also to establish “a security 
component.”78 In his latter regard, and 
as noted in the previous section, Modi 
“has moved unprecedentedly close to 
the United States and to Vietnam, Japan 
and Australia, ... (through a) coalition 
strategy (that) is moving India away 
from its traditional aversion to alli-
ance-like relationships.”79 
Owing to the entrenched nar-
ratives concerning the “Indo-Pacific,” 
India’s continued domination of the 
Indian Ocean Region became a major 
feature of the Act East policy, where-
by “India considers itself as a resident 
power in the Indian Ocean”80 as per 
its cultural and civilizational pedigree. 
Seeing the region as central to ensur-
ing its economic, military, and terri-
torial self-sufficiency, as well as India’s 
modernization of its naval capabilities 
toward a blue-water capacity, under-
pins this desire and whose virtues em-
bolden the ability to Act East. Within 
these parameters, and as a means to 
counter the presence of competitors in 
the region, India believes in “fostering 
exclusive security relationships with 
the regional states so as to promote a 
favourable environment.”81 As such, 
and reiterating this strategic aim, the 
Modi government has carried out sus-
tained and frequent diplomacy “with 
a view to developing a ‘blue economy’ 
based on ocean resources and to pro-
moting dynamics of collective action 
in the maritime security field,”82 which 
in 2015 included the formation of stra-
tegic partnerships with Singapore and 
Vietnam. Concerning the latter, New 
Delhi has provided a US$100 million 
line of credit, discussed the transfer of 
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BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles, 
and signed agreements on coast guard 
cooperation. Underpinned by contin-
ued and deepening economic exchang-
es, these are all significant and now 
entrenched upgrades to India’s foreign 
policy. In turn, the ASEAN-India Free 
Trade Area entered into force in July 
2015, which provided further founda-
tion for the proactive diplomacy that 
hallmarked the Act East policy.
Augmenting other particular 
bilateral relations has also been cru-
cial to the Act East policy, in much the 
same way as amplifying US relations 
has underpinned gaining great power 
status, and intensified Russia and Chi-
na ties have typified the realization of 
a multipolar world order. Thus, with-
in the Indo-Pacific region, “Modi has 
sought to significantly boost ties with 
Japan ... (which) is a break from his 
predecessors.”83 Modi’s 2014 visit to 
Japan was his first outside South Asia 
and witnessed bilateral relations being 
immediately elevated to that of a “Spe-
cial Strategic and Global Partnership.” 
Confirming these linkages, and Modi 
and Shinzo Abe’s ardent nationalism, 
the leaders “decided to create a rela-
tionship that will shape the course of 
their countries and the character of 
this region and the world in this cen-
tury.”84 Abe’s 2015 visit to India saw the 
announcement of the “Vision 2025” 
statement “which reflects a broad con-
vergence of their long-term political, 
economic, and strategic goals”85 and 
centered upon purported political 
congruence concerning pluralism, tol-
erance, the rule of law, and democracy. 
Such a convergence of domestic values 
and identities—both mainstays of con-
structivism—reiterated the closeness 
of their relations and their importance 
concerning enacting the Act East pol-
icy. Further exemplifying these narra-
tives, India invited Japan to become a 
permanent participant in the India-US 
Malabar naval exercises, which To-
kyo took up in 2016, and pointed to 
a deepening triadic relationship be-
tween these states. The addition of an 
explicit security dimension to India–
Japan relations also epitomized a note-
worthy step change in relations that 
stressed mutual “stability and pros-
perity, ... (and) reiterated the need to 
further consolidate their security and 
defence cooperation.”86 Adherence 
to “working jointly for strengthening 
(a) rules-based international order in 
the Indo-Pacific region and beyond”87 
further confirmed such shared aims, 
and additionally formed part of New 
Delhi’s emergent coalition-building 
strategy. This heightening political and 
strategic convergence continued to be 
underpinned by deeper economic ties, 
for example the signing of a deal for Ja-
pan to build a bullet train from Mum-
bai to Ahmedabad, and which further 
emphasized the frequency and repeti-
tion of closer India-Japan ties within 
Indian foreign policy discourses.
Further afield, such tendencies 
within Modi’s foreign policy have been 
confirmed in relations with Austra-
lia, ties which ameliorated the desired 
enactment of the Act East policy and 
wider strategic linkages with the Unit-
ed States and Japan. The first Indian 
prime minister to visit Australia since 
1987, Modi’s 2014 mission recognized 
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a bilateral relationship “anchored in 
shared values, expanding economic 
engagement, converging strategic in-
terests and a growing shared agenda 
in regional and multilateral institu-
tions.”88 Signing agreements on secu-
rity, defense, and counter-terrorism 
cooperation, annual dialogues between 
respective prime ministers, foreign 
ministers, and defense ministers, and 
the sale of uranium to India, Modi de-
creed that “‘we see Australia as one of 
our foremost partners in the region 
... Australia will not be at the periph-
ery of our vision, but at the center of 
our thought’.”89 India and Australia’s 
first ever bilateral naval exercise in 
2015—AUSINDEX-15—boosted and 
regularized these interactions, as did 
the trilateral India-Japan-Australia se-
curity dialogue held since 2015, and as 
will their first bilateral Army-to-Ar-
my exercises in 2018. From this basis, 
through “their commitment to a peace-
ful and prosperous Indo-Pacific, based 
on mutual respect and cooperation, ... 
Australia and India share a commit-
ment to democratic values, rule of law, 
international peace and security, and 
shared prosperity.”90 All these elements 
represent the breaking of new ground 
in India–Australia relations, primari-
ly via the dynamism central to Modi’s 
diplomatic style but also their focus 
upon shared values and interests that 
allow a diplomatic convergence with 
each other. Enhanced relations with 
New Zealand91 have further compli-
mented these substantial developments 
as per the pre-emptive strategic aim to 
enact the Act East policy. 
Conclusions: An Acceleration 
and Tone Shift
As has been displayed across a range of areas, we have been able to discern well-defined 
ways concerning how Indian foreign 
policy have been conceived, achieved, 
and delivered under the Modi-led gov-
ernment. These developments have 
centered upon three key strategic 
aims—gaining great power recognition, 
realizing a multipolar world order, and 
enacting the “Act East” policy—that 
have been the most frequent, repeat-
ed, and reiterated policy preferences 
within official and scholarly narratives. 
In conjunction with our constructiv-
ist-centered analysis, which stressed the 
need for an India-specific emphasis, the 
deployment of a discourse-orientated 
approach enabled the identification and 
analysis of these prevailing elements. Of 
particular note was the wider conver-
gence of shared domestic values across 
many of India’s deepening array of bilat-
eral relations, especially with the great 
powers such as the United States, Rus-
sia, China, Japan, and Australia, which 
served to not only embolden these ties 
but to also further validate and vindi-
cate our favored theoretical and analyt-
ical approach. The underlying nature of 
the three strategic aims as being how 
the Modi-led NDA II conceives of how 
India ought to be positioned/behave 
globally, underscored this strength.
While it remains questionable to 
declare that there is a clear “Modi Doc-
trine,” as Sridharan pertinently notes 
“recent foreign policy changes have 
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been slow and incremental, building on 
past policies without dramatic breaks; 
... the Modi government’s initiatives 
since 2014 seem to represent a more 
energized version of earlier foreign 
policy changes.”92 In these ways, the 
primary impact of the current prime 
minister has been that of acceleration, 
whereby existing policies and behav-
iors have been significantly augmented, 
enhanced, and fast-tracked. In the bi-
lateral sphere, such trends are most evi-
dent in India’s relations with the United 
States, Japan, and Australia, while ties 
with Russia continue to be strength-
ened. Even with China, notwithstand-
ing ongoing border tensions, relations 
have deepened—at least economically. 
Multilaterally, India has also been more 
assertive by both creating and joining 
institutions—efforts that are improving 
her diplomatic, and accompanying eco-
nomic and political, capabilities. Final-
ly, the Act East policy is a clear example 
of proactive dynamism and verve being 
injected into the predecessor Look East 
approach. In these ways, “Modi’s stra-
tegic approach to foreign policy shows 
essential continuity ... (concerning) the 
use of power, diversity of security re-
lationships and the pursuit of status.”93 
The three key policy aims of gaining 
great power prestige, realizing multipo-
lar ambitions, and becoming a critical 
Indo-Pacific actor all confirm these on-
going facets.
Our utilization of the construc-
tivism-based and discourse-focused ap-
proach sought to unveil the dominant 
narratives inherent to Modi’s diploma-
cy and its scholastic analysis thus far, 
which have confirmed the presence of 
the three key foreign policy aims. Apart 
from the acceleration noted above, 
what interconnects these three aims is 
a significant tone shift concerning the 
conduct of Indian foreign policy. The 
style, character, and attitude of the cur-
rent prime minister are critical in this 
regard, whereby “his conviction ... pro-
vides (the) firm bedrock for Modi’s for-
eign policy.”94 Like Vajpayee before him, 
Modi’s foreign policy approach rests 
upon clear pragmatism but is deliv-
ered in an unambiguous, unashamed, 
and unforgiving manner that consis-
tently places India’s interests front and 
center, and is not beholden to the past 
or previous policy benchmarks. Many 
of these characteristics are also firmly 
embedded within the BJP’s outlook on 
the world, through which “projecting 
cultural identity and national brand-
ing are integral elements of enhancing 
global standing.”95 Whether or not this 
tone shift contributes to an enduring 
re-orientation of Indian foreign policy 
remains to be seen. However, if Modi 
wins the next general election in 2019, 
this will be a reinforcing mechanism 
that will necessarily legitimize his ap-
proach, and perhaps confirm the lasting 
normative impact of the “Modian” style 
upon Indian foreign policy for genera-
tions to come.
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